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FROM:
Harvard Educational Review Vol. 75 No. 1 Spring 2005
Copyright © by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

What “Counts” as Educational Policy? Notes toward a New Paradigm
JEAN ANYON
City University of New York

In my first article as a young PhD, which was published in the Harvard Educational
Review, I argued that high school U.S. history curriculum, as represented
in widely used textbooks, excises and thereby defines out of existence
radical responses American workers have had to the problems they face on the
job and in their communities (Anyon, 1979). This educational excision is one
way that schooling mitigates against the development of working-class consciousness.
In empirical and theoretical work since then, I have investigated knowledge
and pedagogical experiences made available to students in different socialclass
contexts (1980, 1981), and have attempted to understand the consequences
of ways we conceptualize urban education, urban school reform, and
neighborhood poverty. Recent arguments have aimed at unseating simplistic
notions of the causes of urban poverty and low achievement in city districts,
and explicating unexplored relations between urban education and movements
for social change (e.g., 1995, 1997, 2005).

In this chapter I think about education policy over the seventy-five years of
Harvard Educational Review publication. During these decades, many K–12 policies
have been written and implemented by federal, state, and local governments.
Some of these have aimed at improving education in America’s cities
and are my primary focus. Over the years, dominant strategies called upon to
improve urban schools have included curricular, administrative, and funding
reforms, as well as increases in educational opportunity and district/school
accountability.

A historical examination of policies can inform decisions we make today.
Policy failures, for example, may demonstrate that we need to rethink strate-
gies we choose in our long-term attempts to solve the problems of school and
student achievement in urban districts. Indeed, I will argue that the quality of
education in city schools is a complex problem, and education policy as historically
conceived has not been adequate to the task of increasing urban school
achievement to acceptable levels. Academic learning in city schools is undoubtedly
higher than in, say, 1900, yet there is still no large urban district
that can demonstrate high achievement in even half its students or schools.
Noting this failure of educational policy to render most urban schools highquality
institutions, I ask, what should count as educational policy? As in any attempt
to resolve complex issues, workable solutions can only be generated by
an understanding of underlying causes.

The diagnosis I provide is based on analyses completed for my book, Radical
Possibilities: Public Policy, Urban Education, and a New Social Movement (Anyon,
2005). In this book I examine federal and regional mandates that affect economic
and social opportunities available to the urban poor. I find that despite
stated intentions, federal and metropolitan policies and arrangements generally
restrict opportunities available to city residents and neighborhoods. I
show how job, wage, housing, tax, and transportation policies maintain minority
poverty in urban neighborhoods, and thereby create environments that
overwhelm the potential of educational policy to create systemic, sustained
improvements in the schools. For example, policies such as minimum wage
statutes that yield full-time pay below the poverty level, and affordable housing
and transportation policies that segregate low-income workers of color in
urban areas but industrial and other job development in far-flung suburbs
where public transit routes do not reach, are all culpable.

In order to solve the systemic problems of urban education, then, I argue in
the book — and will argue here — that we need not only better schools but
also the reform of these public policies. Rules and regulations regarding
teaching, curriculum, and assessment certainly are important, but policies to
eliminate poverty-wage work and housing segregation (for example) should
be part of the educational policy panoply as well, for these have consequences
for urban education at least as profound as curriculum, pedagogy, and testing.

In the sections that follow I describe major K–12 education policies that
have been implemented over the years to attempt to improve urban education,
and then discuss several federal and metro-area policies and practices
that limit the potential and success of these strategies. I also report hopeful
new research suggesting that even modest income and other family supports
typically improve low-income students’ academic achievement. I end by arguing
that, given this power of economic access to influence educational outcomes,
strategies to support economic opportunity and development for urban
residents and neighborhoods should be among the policies we consider
in our attempts to improve urban schools and districts. Just as in affluent suburban
districts where economic strength is the engine of educational reform,
so it would be in urban districts where resident and neighborhood affluence
would support and retool the schools. I begin with an overview of education
policy as typically conceived.

Education Policies
Over the last seventy-five years or so, federal policies have attempted various
strategies to improve city education. The first federal policy aimed at workingclass
populations was the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, which provided funds to
prepare students in industrialized areas for working-class jobs through vocational
programs. Variants of this policy continued throughout the twentieth
century, in the Vocational Education Acts of 1963, 1984, and 1998, and in the
School-to-Work Opportunity Act of 1994 and the later federal legislation in
which it was subsumed.

Some federal education policies have attempted to improve urban education
by making funding available for increased curriculum materials and libraries,
early childhood classes, and various types of programmatic innovations
in city schools. Head Start in 1965, Follow Through in 1967, and, to a
lesser extent, Title IX, which banned sex discrimination in 1972, brought and
instigated new curricula and programs into city districts.1 These policies were
intended to increase student access and/or achievement by upgrading
curricular resources and experiences.

Other federal K–12 policies have aimed specifically at increasing educational
equity. The 1954 Brown decision (which committed the federal government
to desegregation as a policy stance), the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA), the Bilingual Act in 1968, Title IX in 1972, and
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975 opened doors to academic
experiences for previously underserved K–12 students. These policies
are generally thought to have expanded urban students’ educational opportunities.
More recent federal education policies to improve schooling — with urban
students and teachers often a target — have called for increased academic
standards and requirements, standardized testing, and professional development
of teachers. These policies were recommended by the influential report
A Nation at Risk, commissioned by President Ronald Reagan and published in
1983. The emphasis on increased academic standards was part of an effort to
support business needs for well-prepared workers and employees. The report’s
recommendations for higher standards and increased testing were introduced
as policy in 1994 and 1996 as part of the Goals 2000 legislation. In
2001 these goals were instantiated as federal mandates in the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB). Privatization of education via nonpublic providers when
K–12 schools fail is a subtextual education policy in NCLB (Conley, 2003;
Cross, 2004; Stein, 2004).

It is important to note that federal education policies intended to improve
urban schools did not take aim at the economic arrangements and practices
that themselves produced the poverty in which city schools were embedded.
Despite increases in educational opportunity, the effects of almost a century
of educational policies on urban school and student achievement have, by
most accounts, been disappointing.

The first state policies regarding the education of America’s urban (and rural)
poor emerged earlier than federal ones. What has counted as state education
policy regarding poor students can be said to have begun with mid- to
late-nineteenth century insertions into state constitutions of the right of all
students to a free, “thorough,” “efficient,” or “useful” education (Odden &
Picus, 1992). Following these insertions and until the 1970s, however, most
state education policies did not focus specifically on urban education. State
mandates typically set regulations and requirements for school systems,
teacher and administrator preparation, and school funding (through property
taxes). During the 1970s and 1980s, lawsuits challenging state education
funding systems brought increased attention to city schools and districts. State
urban education policy in these decades involved various kinds of efforts, including
school-based management and basic skills mandates. In the 1990s,
state policies attempted to align education standards and regulations with federal
ones, mandated curriculum and teacher licensure reform, and closely
monitored urban districts. As legal challenges to state systems have led to increased
funding of city schools, states have imposed stricter academic and
graduation requirements, as well as multigrade and multisubject standardized
testing. Quasi-privatization policies supporting charter schools, vouchers, and
other school choice programs have also been a state strategy to attempt to
improve the education of urban children by offering them a choice of schools
to attend (Conley, 2003).

Over the decades, federal and state policies codified an increasing number
of requirements that urban schools and districts must meet. Local governments
and educational bureaucracies have undertaken a plethora of programs
to attempt to meet those guidelines. Local districts have also mounted
school reform projects in response to local social conditions and political
pressure from parents and communities. Most local initiatives have been
curricular, pedagogical, and administrative.

During the Progressive Era, cities consolidated and professionalized their
school systems and personnel, introduced programs like the Gary Plan to prepare
students for the industrial experience, increased access to high school,
organized educational opportunities for immigrant parents, and sometimes
fed, bathed, and clothed poor children. During the decade of the Great Depression,
most large cities retrenched and severely cut educational social service
and academic programs, as local tax receipts plummeted and banks that
offered loans demanded broad cuts in education. During the 1960s, many urban
districts were weakened further as most remaining businesses and jobs
moved to the suburbs, decimating the urban property tax base (Anyon, 1997;
Ravitch, 2000; Tyack, 1974; Wrigley, 1982).

Since the 1970s, in response to federal, judicial, and state mandates, urban
districts have bused students to meet racial integration guidelines, decentralized
authority to increase community participation, and created magnet
schools to attempt to attract middle-class parents. Other local policies that
have been attempted to improve achievement are a multitude of reform programs
or “school improvement projects,” student retention services, privatization
of educational offerings, vouchers and magnets, mayoral control, small
schools, and curriculum standardization and evaluation through testing. The
social context of these policies has included pressure to be accountable in the
wake of increased funding, as well as community and corporate demands for
better schools. None of the local policies has focused on the poverty of
families or neighborhoods.

One way to evaluate this long run of education policy is to compare the
achievement of urban students at the beginning of the twentieth and twentyfirst
centuries. Although achievement is higher now in that larger percentages
of students remain in school past the elementary years than in 1900, I would
argue that the improvement is relative and illusory. That is, while in the early
twentieth century relatively few urban poor students went beyond fifth grade,
the vast majority did not require further education to find employment in industries
that could lead to middle-class income (Anyon, 1997; Ayres, 1909).

Currently, relatively few urban poor students go past ninth grade: The graduation
rates in large comprehensive inner-city high schools are abysmally low. In
fourteen such New York City schools, for example, only 10 percent to 20 percent
of ninth graders in 1996 graduated four years later (Fine, 2001; Greene
2001; Miao & Haney, 2004).2 Despite the fact that low-income individuals desperately
need a college degree to find decent employment, only 7 percent
obtain a bachelors degree by age twenty-six (Education Trust, 2001; Mishel,
Bernstein, & Schmitt, 2001). So, in relation to the needs of low-income students,
urban districts fail their students with more egregious consequences
now than in the early twentieth century.
Given the plethora of federal, state, and local education policies aimed at
urban schools and the current widely acknowledged necessity of high-quality
education for all, why have most urban schools and districts not been able to
provide such an education for their students?

Barriers to High-Quality Public Education in Cities
There are multiple causes of low-quality schooling in urban areas, and education
policies as heretofore conceived address only a few. Education policy has
not addressed the neighborhood poverty that surrounds and invades urban
schools with low expectations and cynicism. Education policy has not addressed
the unemployment and joblessness of families who will have few if any
resources for the further education of their children, even if they excel in
K–12 classes.

And education policy — even in response to state financial challenges —
has not addressed the political economy that largely determines low levels of
city district funding. Taxes on wealthy families and corporations are among
the lowest on record (Phillips, 2002). Business and government investment in
affluent suburban job centers rather than urban areas continues to deprive
poor neighborhoods of entry-level jobs and a tax base, and residents’ poverty
wages further diminish available funding sources (Anyon, 2005; Orfield, 2002;
Rusk, 1999). These political-economic constraints on quality schooling are
not challenged by current or past education policy. In most U.S. cities, the political
leverage of urban parents has not been sufficient to force the funding
necessary to overcome outdated buildings, broken computer labs, and overcrowded
classrooms.

These economic and political conditions are the building blocks of formidable
barriers to systemic, sustainable school quality. Indeed, even when urban
school reform succeeds, it fails — when there are no decent jobs a diploma
from a successfully reformed school or district will attract, and there is no government
or familial funding sufficient for the vast majority of low-income graduates
of even good urban high schools to obtain a bachelors degree.
Individual and neighborhood poverty builds walls around schools and classrooms
that education policy does not penetrate or scale. In the following section
I describe some of the federal and metro-area policies and arrangements
that sustain these barriers.

Federal Policy
Analysts typically do not link federal policies to the maintenance of poverty, to
the lack of jobs that bedevils American workers, or to the increasingly large
portion of employment that pays poverty and near-poverty wages. Yet federal
policy is determinative. To take a blatant example, Congress set the first minimum
wage in 1938 at $3.05 (in 2000 dollars); it stands in 2005 at $5.15 — a
mere two dollars more. (Yearly income at this wage is $10,712.) This sum ensures
that full-time, year-round, minimum-wage work will not raise people out
of poverty (Mishel, Bernstein, & Boushey, 2003). Analysis in 2004 found that
minimum-wage standards directly affect the wages of 8.9 percent of the workforce
(9.9 million workers); when we include those making one dollar more
an hour than the minimum wage, this legislation affects the wages of as much
as 18 percent of the workforce (Economic Policy Institute, 2004). Contrary to
the claims of those who oppose raising the minimum wage (that an increase
will force employers to fire, or hire fewer of those affected by the increase),
studies of the 1990–1991 and 1996–1997 minimum-wage increases failed to
find any systematic, significant job losses associated with the increases and
found no evidence of negative employment effects on small businesses (Economic
Policy Institute, 2004).

Almost half the workforce earns what some economists call poverty-zone
wages (and what I define as up to and including 125% of the official poverty
level; Anyon, 2005). I analyzed figures provided by the Economic Policy Institute
to calculate the overall percentage of people who work full-time year
round yet make wages up to and including 125 percent of the official poverty
threshold needed to support a family of four at the poverty level. The analysis
demonstrates that in 1999, during a very strong economy, almost half of the
people at work in the United States (41.3%) earned poverty-zone wages — in
1999, $10.24/hour ($21,299/year) or less, working full-time year round
(Mishel et al., 2001). Two years later, in 2001, 38.4 percent earned povertyzone
wages working full-time year round (in 2001, 125% of the poverty line
was a $10.88 hourly wage; Mishel et al., 2003). This suggests that the federal
minimum-wage policy is an important determinant of poverty for many
millions of U.S. families.

There are other macroeconomic policies that produce hardship. These especially
penalize Blacks and Latinos, the majority of whom live in segregated,
low-income urban neighborhoods. These policies include the following: job
training as a predominant federal antipoverty policy when there have been
too few jobs for graduates; ineffective federal implementation of policies that
outlaw racial discrimination in hiring and housing; regressive income taxes
that charge wealthy individuals less than half the rate charged the rich during
most of the first sixty years of the twentieth century, yet substantially raise the
payroll taxes paid by the working poor and middle class; and corporate tax
policies in recent years that allow 60 percent of large U.S. corporations to pay
no federal taxes at all (and in some cases to obtain millions in rebates; Citizens
for Tax Justice, 2002; Lafer, 2002; Orfield, 2002; Rusk, 1999).

These federal policies and practices contribute to personal, neighborhood,
and educational poverty because they lead to the following problems: There
are not enough jobs for poor families who need them; low-income families of
color are concentrated in low-resourced urban neighborhoods; and when the
wealthy do not contribute equitably to public expenses, funding for services
like education declines and the quality of the services tends to be low.

The effects of these policies are compounded by harsh union laws and lack
of federal protection for labor organizing; Federal Reserve Bank pronouncements
that ignore the portion of its mandate to maintain a high level of employment;
and free-trade agreements that send thousands of corporations,
and their job opportunities, to other countries. These policies hurt workers of
all colors — and in most sectors of the economy — as existing jobs disappear
and those remaining pay lower wages, in part because they are not unionized
(Anyon, 2005; Citizens for Tax Justice, 2002; Economic Policy Institute, 2002,
2004; Galbraith, 1998; Lafer, 2002; Mishel et al., 2001).

However, there are federal policies we could create that would lower poverty
by important margins — including a significantly raised minimum wage,
comparable worth laws, and policies to enforce existing regulations that outlaw
discrimination in hiring. A raise in the minimum wage that brought workers
above poverty would improve the lives of at least a fifth of U.S. workers
(Economic Policy Institute, 2004). Paying women the same amount men are
paid for comparable work would, according to one analysis, reduce poverty
by 40 percent, as such a large percentage of poor people are women in lowwage
jobs (Lafer, 2002). And requiring employers to hire without discriminating
against Blacks and Latinos would further open opportunities currently
denied.
In addition, policies that worked against U.S. poverty in the past could be reinstated:
U.S. government regulation of the minimum wage, which kept lowpaid
workers’ income at the median of highly paid unionized workers in the decades
after World War II; federal support for union organizing; a federal program
of job creation in cities, as during the Great Depression of the 1930s; and
federal programs for urban youth that would support further education, as
such policies did for eight million men and women after World War II (Anyon,
2005; Galbraith, 1998). These national policies were important supports of the
widespread prosperity of the United States’ working and middle classes in the
quarter century following 1945 (Galbraith, 1998).

Metropolitan Policy and Practice
Like current federal mandates, there are metro-area policies and practices
that increase the problems of urban residents and neighborhoods. Metro areas
are shaped by regional markets — for jobs, housing, investment, and production.
Metro areas account for over 80 percent of national output and drive
the economic performance of the nation as a whole. Each metro area is anchored
by one or more cities (Dreier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2001).

Today, metropolitan regions are characterized by population growth, extensive
inequality, and segregation (Orfield, 2002; Rusk, 1999). The percentage
of racial minorities in large metro areas who live in the suburbs jumped
from 19 percent to 27 percent during the 1990s. However, a growing share of
these families lives in fiscally stressed suburbs, with an increasing number of
neighborhoods having poverty levels over 30 percent (Kingsley & Petit, 2003;
Orfield, 2002). As in areas of concentrated poverty in the central city, low levels
of taxable resources in these “urbanized” segregated suburbs leave services
like education lacking in funds.

U.S. metropolitan areas are characterized by the following problems, all of
which disadvantage urban minority families and communities: Most entrylevel
jobs for which adults with low to moderate education levels are qualified
are increasingly located in suburbs, rather than in central cities, but public
transit systems do not connect these suburban job centers to urban areas,
where most low-income minorities live—thus preventing them from access to
jobs there. State-allowed local zoning on the basis of income prevents affordable
housing in most suburbs where entry-level jobs are located, which means
there is little if any housing for low-income families near the suburban job
centers. Indeed, as I have mentioned, the failure to enforce antiracial discrimination
statutes in housing confines most Blacks and Latinos to housing sites
in central cities and segregated suburbs. Finally, even though federal and state
taxes are paid by residents throughout metro regions (including inner cities),
most tax-supported development takes place in the affluent suburbs rather
than in low-income areas. Thus, few jobs exist in most low-income urban
neighborhoods (Anyon, 2005; Dreir et al., 2001; Orfield, 2002; Rusk, 1999).
These inequitable regional arrangements and policies exacerbate federal
wage and job mandates and contribute in important ways to joblessness and
poverty in cities and urbanized suburbs, and to the low quality of investment
in services such as education there.

Poverty
One consequence of federal and regional policies regarding work, wages,
housing segregation, and transportation is that the numbers of poor people
approach the figures of 1959 — before massive urban poverty became a national
issue. Although the percentages are lower now, the numbers are still
staggering: There were about as many people officially poor in 1993 (39.2
million) as in 1959 (39.4 million; Harrington, 1963). And in 2003, 35.8 million
were officially poor, only 3.5 million fewer than in 1959 (Mishel et al.,
2003).

A more realistic measure of poverty than federal guidelines is that those
earning incomes up to 200 percent of the official levels are considered poor
(Bernstein, Brocht, & Spade-Aguilar, 2000; Citro & Michael, 1995; Short, Iceland,
& Garner, 1999). This revised threshold is used by increasing numbers of
social scientists. A calculation of the individuals who earned less than 200 percent
of the poverty level in 2001 ($17.40/hour, or $36,192/year), demonstrates
a much larger percentage of poor employees than is commonly acknowledged:
84 percent of Hispanic workers, 80 percent of Black workers, and 64.3
percent of White workers made wages at or under 200 percent of the official poverty line
(Mishel et al., 2001).

A calculation of families living with earnings up to 200 percent of the poverty
line reveals that Black and Latino families face the greatest financial hurdles.
More than 50 percent of Black and Latino families earn less than 200 percent
of the poverty level, compared to only 20.3 percent of White families,
even though White families constitute a slight majority (50.5%) of families
that fall below 200 percent of the poverty level (Mishel et al., 2001). In sum,
poverty in the United States is higher than commonly perceived and is maintained
in urban areas by federal and metro-area policies and distributions.

Effects of Poverty on Urban Students
Macroeconomic policies that set wages below poverty levels, that train innercity
hopefuls for jobs that do not exist, that do not extract from the wealthy a
fair share of social expenses, and that rarely enforce laws that would substantially
decrease the economic discrimination of people of color all support persistent
poverty and near-poverty among minority urban populations. This economic
and social distress can prevent children from developing their full
potential and can certainly dampen the enthusiasm, effort, and expectations
with which urban children and their families approach K–12 education.
As I will report, a recent national study of young children confirms the potential
of impoverished circumstances to prevent students’ full cognitive
growth before they enroll in kindergarten. Of countervailing power, however,
is research demonstrating that when parents obtain better financial resources
or better living conditions, the educational achievement of the children typically
improves significantly. These findings empirically support the argument
that for the urban poor, even with the right educational policies in place,
school achievement may await a family’s economic access.

I already presented adult poverty figures at the official threshold and noted
the alarming increase in numbers when a more realistic assessment is made.
The same disparities exist between federal and alternative counts of poor children.
Sixteen percent of American children — almost 12 million — lived below
the official federal poverty line in 2001. Almost half of those children
(44%, or a little over 5 million) lived in extreme poverty (less than half the poverty
line, or $7,400 for a family of three in 2001) — including nearly a million
African American children. This was a 17 percent increase in the number of
children in extreme poverty from 2000, at the end of the economic boom
(Cauthen & Lu, 2001; Dillon, 2003; Lu, 2003).

When the more appropriate alternative poverty threshold criterion is applied,
however, a full 38 percent of American children are identified as poor —
27 million who lived in families with income up to 200 percent of the official
poverty line. These children live in poverty as well — although official statistics
do not designate them as such. However, these families experience hardships
that are almost as severe as those who are officially poor (Cauthen & Lu 2001;
Lu, 2003). By the revised measure — 200 percent of the official poverty cutoff — a full
57 percent of African American children, 64 percent of Latino, and 34 percent of White
children were poor in the United States in 2001 (Lu, 2003; Mishel et al., 2003).

It is only in the 1990s that empirical studies focused on why and how poverty
affects cognitive development and school achievement. Researchers began
to document the specific effects of poverty environments on children’s
development (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Leventhal, & Aber, 1997; Goering &
Feins, 2003; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002). This body of work
documents the correlations between low income, child development, and educational
achievement (see Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 1997, for an overview of
studies). For example, poverty has been found to have consistently negative
effects on children’s cognitive development (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 1997;
Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, & Klebanov, 1994; McLoyd, 1998). Longitudinal studies
that have been carried out also demonstrate that “family income consistently
predicts children’s academic and cognitive performance, even when
other family characteristics are taken into account” (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn,
1997). Persistent and extreme poverty has been shown to be more detrimental
to children than temporary poverty (Bolger & Patterson, 1995; Duncan et al.,
1994). Family income may influence children through both lack of resources
and parental emotional stress (Bradley, 1984; McLoyd & Jartayne, 1994;
Smith, Brooks-Gunn, & Klebanov, 1997; Sugland, Zaslow, Brooks-Gunn, &
Moore, 1995). Poor children have more health and behavior difficulties than
those from more affluent families, which mitigates against educational success
(Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Houser, Brown, & Prosser, 1997; Klerman,
1991/2003; Korenman & Miller, 1997). Studies collected by Duncan and
Brooks-Gunn teased out some of the variables within the effects of income. In
summarizing research reported in their 1997 volume Consequences of Growing
up Poor, they point out the following:

1. Income matters for the cognitive development of preschoolers “because
it is associated with the provision of a richer learning environment” (p.
601). This is true in part because family income is a “significant determinant
of child care environments, including center-based childcare (p.
601). . . . Income allows parents to provide their children with safer,
more stimulating home environments; to live in communities with better
schools, parks, and libraries and more challenging peers; to afford tuition
and other expenses associated with higher education; to purchase
or otherwise gain access to higher-quality health care; and in many other
ways to buy the things that promote the health and development of their
children” (p. 14).

2. “A variety of income measures — income [relative to needs] . . . income
loss, the ratio of debts to assets, and unstable work — are associated with
family economic pressure” (p. 602). Economic pressure has been found
to be associated with depression (and stress) in parents, which can affect
parenting, and thus school achievement.

3. “Family income is usually a stronger predictor of ability and achievement
outcomes than are measures of parental schooling or family structure
[e.g., single parenthood]” (p. 603). Many studies have shown that children
raised in low-income families score lower than children from more
affluent families do on assessments of health, cognitive development,
and positive behavior. “In general, the better the measure of family income
and the longer the period over which it is measured, the stronger
the association between the family’s economic well-being and children’s
outcomes” (p. 14).

It is important to understand that these findings do not suggest that poor
students are of low intelligence; rather, the studies point to the power of the
economy — and of economic hardship — to place extremely high hurdles to
full development in front of children who are poor. It is of course possible —
although it is not the norm—that education over time mitigates the effects of
SES (Hout, 1988; Jencks & Phillips, 1998).

In 2002, Valerie Lee and David Burkham published the results of a largesample
assessment of the effects of poverty on cognitive development. They
utilized data from the United States Department of Education’s early childhood
longitudinal kindergarten cohort, which is a comprehensive dataset that
provides a nationally representative portrait of kindergarten students. Lee
and Burkham (2002) explored differences in young children’s achievement
scores in literacy and mathematics by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status
(SES) as they began kindergarten. They also analyzed differences by social
background in an array of children’s homes and family activities.

The study demonstrates that inequalities in children’s cognitive ability by
SES are substantial even before children begin kindergarten and that poverty
has a detrimental impact on early intellectual achievement. Importantly, it
demonstrates that the disadvantages of being poor outweigh by far the race or
family structure of children as causes of the cognitive disadvantages.
Details of the national assessment include the following:

1. Before children enter kindergarten, the average cognitive scores of children
in the highest SES group are 60 percent above the scores of the lowest
SES group.
2. Cognitive skills are much less closely related to race/ethnicity after accounting
for SES. After taking racial differences into account, children
from different SES groups achieve at different levels—before they begin
kindergarten.
3. The impact of family structure on cognitive skills (e.g., being in a singleparent
family) is much less than either race or SES.
4. Socioeconomic status is very strongly related to cognitive skills; SES accounts
for more of the variation in cognitive scores than any other factor
by far.

Lee and Burkham (2002) also found that disadvantaged children not only
enter kindergarten with significantly lower cognitive skills than their advantaged
peers, but also that low-SES children begin school (kindergarten) in systematically
lower-quality elementary schools than their more advantaged
counterparts. “However school quality is defined—in terms of higher student
achievement, more school resources, more qualified teachers, more positive
teacher attitudes, better neighborhood or school conditions, private vs. public
schools — the least advantaged United States children begin their formal
schooling in consistently lower-quality schools. This reinforces the inequalities
that develop even before children reach school age” (p. 3; see also Entwistle &
Alexander, 1997; Phillips, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klevanov, & Crane, 1998;
Phillips, Crouse, & Ralph, 1998; Stipic & Ryan, 1997; White, 1982).
In their review of studies of poverty’s effects on individual development,
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) conclude, “Taken together, [these studies]
suggest that programs that raise the incomes of poor families will enhance the
cognitive development of children and may improve their chance of success
in [education and] the labor market during adulthood. Most important appears
to be the elimination of deep and persistent poverty during a child’s
early years” (p. 608). I now turn to research suggesting that familial financial
and other supports do indeed lead to increased educational achievement in
children.

Evidence that Familial Supports Raise Educational Achievement
I have been examining relationships among education policy, the economy,
and achievement in urban schools. First, I critiqued education policy for its
lack of attention to urban poverty, which, I argued, is maintained by policies
and decisions made at the federal and metropolitan levels. I provided evidence
of some of the egregious consequences of federal and regional policies
and practices for urban families, neighborhoods, students, and schools. In
particular, I demonstrated that child poverty creates obstacles to full development
and educational achievement, especially when low-income minority
children attend low-resourced schools — which most do. In this section I provide
indirect and direct research evidence that increased family supports such
as financial resources and less segregated neighborhoods raise educational
achievement.

Indirect evidence is present in a longitudinal study completed in 2003 that
found that improving family income reduces the negative (aggressive) social
behavior of children, which in turn is likely to lead to better school behavior
and performance. For eight years, researchers studied a representative population
sample of 1,420 children ages nine to thirteen in rural North Carolina.
A quarter of the children were from a Cherokee reservation. Psychological
tests were given at the start of the study and repeated each year (Costello,
Compton, Keeler, & Angold, 2003; O’Connor, 2003).

When the study began, 68 percent of the children were living below the official
poverty line. On average, the poorer children engaged in more vandalism,
stealing, bullying, stubbornness, and outbursts of anger than those who were
not poor. But halfway through the study, a local casino began distributing a
percentage of its profits to tribal families. Given to each tribal member over
eighteen and put in a trust fund for younger members, the payment increased
slightly each year, reaching about $6,000 per person for the year 2001. Psychiatric
tests administered by researchers for the four years that the funds were
being distributed demonstrated that the negative behaviors of children in
families who were no longer poor dropped to the same levels found among
children whose families had never been poor (decreasing by 40%). Parents
who moved out of poverty reported having more time to spend with their children,
and researchers identified better parenting behavior. Researchers also
identified the psychological benefits of not being poor as important to both
parents and children. Poverty puts stress on families, which can increase the
likelihood of children developing behavioral problems. One parent in the
study told researchers that “the jobs [produced by the casino] give people the
chance to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and get out of poverty. That
carries over into less juvenile crime, less domestic violence, and an overall
better living experience for families” (O’Connor, 2003, p. 2).
Other research demonstrates that urban low-income parents are also able
to practice more effective parenting strategies when some of the stress of
poverty is eased by a higher income. And the reduction in stress in turn may
positively affect the behavior and achievement of low-income children (see information
below; also Jackson, Brooks-Gunn, Huang, & Glassman, 2000; Jeremiah,
2003; Seitz, Rosenbaum, & Apfel, 1985).

Direct evidence that income supports improved educational achievement is
also available. In March 2001, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
(MDRC) published a synthesis of research on how welfare and work policies
affect the children of single mothers (Morris, Huston, Duncan, Crosby, &
Bos, 2001). This synthesis reviewed data from evaluations of five programs that
provided income supplements to poverty-wage workers (Florida’s Family Transition
Program, the Minnesota Family Investment Program, the National Evaluation
of Welfare-to-Work Strategies, Milwaukee’s New Hope for Families and
Children Program, and the Self-Sufficiency Project). These programs offered
supports of differing kinds to poverty-wage workers — income supplements,
earnings disregards (rules that allow working welfare recipients to keep more of
their income when they go to work), subsidized health care, employment services,
counseling, supervised afterschool activities for children and youth, and
informal get-togethers with project staff.

MDRC’s review of the studies found that even relatively small income supplements
to working parents (amounting to about $4,000 per year) improved
children’s elementary school achievement by about 10 to 15 percent of the average
variation in the control groups. These improvements were seen on test
scores as well as on ratings by parents and/or teachers. The earning supplements
had “consistently positive impacts on children’s [school] achievement”
(Morris et al., 2001, p. 63). The positive effects were small, but were statistically
significant.

Longitudinal studies have found that the achievement and behavior problems
of young children can have important implications for their well-being in
adolescence and adulthood (Caspi, Wright, Moffit, & Silva, 1998; Masten &
Coatsworth, 1995). Moreover, even small differences between children in
school achievement early on can translate into larger differences later (Entwistle
& Alexander, 1997). Therefore, as the authors of the research synthesis
state, “a program’s effects on children, even if the effects are small, may continue
to have implications over the course of their lives” (Caspi et al., 1998,
p. 25).

The earning supplements provided by four of these programs did not, however,
bring the families above the poverty level. The improvements in children’s
school achievement and behavior from even these relatively meager
cash supplements for working families suggest that if we were to increase family
resources substantially, we could probably improve educational and social
outcomes for children substantially.

Indeed, one program that did provide an earning supplement that brought
the families above poverty level showed particularly impressive results for children’s
behavior and achievement. New Hope for Families and Children was
run between 1994 and 1998 in two inner-city areas in Milwaukee. Candidates
had to live in one of two targeted areas, be eighteen or older, be willing and
able to work at least thirty hours per week, and have a household income at or
below 150 percent of the federal poverty level (Huston et al., 2001). Almost 90
percent of the adults in the sample were single or separated mothers with children
when they entered the study, and 80 percent were receiving public assistance.
The program was conceived by a nonprofit community-based organization
and provided several benefits: the earnings supplement, subsidized
health insurance, and subsidized child care. The program offered help in obtaining
a job and provided a community-service job for up to one year for
those not able to find work elsewhere, the advice and support of project staff
were made available. The annual cost of providing these benefits was $5,300
per family.

New Hope was evaluated at two-year and five-year intervals using a random
assignment research design. After conducting outreach in the communities to
identify eligible people, the study enrolled over 1,300 low-income adults. Half
the applicants were randomly assigned to a program group that received New
Hope’s benefits, and the other half were randomly assigned to a control group
that was not eligible for the benefits.

Both evaluations showed positive results (Bos, Huston, Duncan, Brock, &
McLoyd, 1996; Huston et al., 2001). Financial supplements in the New Hope
program did reduce the number of families in poverty, but both program and
control groups reported similar levels of hardship, such as food insecurity and
financial insufficiency. Yet the program had positive effects on parents’ wellbeing
and coping skills. As Huston et al. (2003) explain:

Parents in the New Hope group were more aware of available “helping” resources
in the community, such as where to find assistance with energy costs or
housing problems. More of them also knew about the [Earned Income Tax
Credit] and its support, an important source of support for low-income workers.
Ethnographic data suggest that a significant number of families intentionally
used the Earned Income Tax Credits as a savings plan for making major purchases,
reducing debt, and stabilizing rent and other payments. Parents in New
Hope also reported better physical health and fewer symptoms associated with
depression than did parents in the control group. At the two-year point, New
Hope parents reported reduced stress, increased feelings of social support, and
increased time pressure. The ethnographic study found that many parents had
children with disabilities or behavioral difficulties; New Hope helped the parents
achieve a difficult balance among work, services, and parenting. . . . The
New Hope parents did report fewer problems controlling their children, and
parents of adolescents reported more effective management (better control and
less need for punishment). (p. 9)

New Hope improved children’s school performance. “At both the two-year
and the five-year points, children in the program performed better than control
group children on several measures of academic achievement, particularly
on reading and literacy tests. After five years, they scored higher on a
standardized test of reading skills and their parents reported that they got
higher grades in reading skills” (Huston et al., 2001, p. 13). These effects were
slightly more pronounced for boys than for girls. Compared with their control
group counterparts, boys in New Hope also received higher ratings of academic
performance from their teachers and were more likely to expect to attend
college at both the two-year and the five-year assessments. “New Hope adolescents
reported more engagement with schools, feelings of efficacy, and
expectations to finish college than did their control group counterparts” (pp.
13–14). New Hope’s effects are consistent with the results of other programs
that have improved children’s outcomes by providing wage supplements and
subsidized child care (Michalopoulos et al., 2002; Morris et al., 2001).
Indeed, the New Hope findings are in line with the increased educational
achievement of students that has been identified in large-scale programs that
assist low-income minority families by helping them move from inner-city
neighborhoods to more affluent and/or less segregated metropolitan areas.
The first of these “mobility programs” was the Gautreaux program in the Chicago
metropolitan area.

As a result of a victorious lawsuit charging the Chicago Housing Authority
with segregation in public housing, the court ordered the housing authority
to move families who wanted to live in less segregated areas of the city and suburbs.
The Gautreaux program moved over 7,000 families to higher-income
areas of the Chicago metropolitan region between 1976 and 1998 (Rubinowitz
& Rosenbaum, 2002). Although at first a disproportionate number of the children
who moved were placed in classes for the learning disabled by their suburban
schools, they ultimately were significantly more likely than their urban
counterparts to be in college-bound tracks, in four-year colleges, and were
subsequently more likely to be employed in jobs with higher pay and with benefits
than children who stayed in the city (Rubinowitz & Rosenbaum, 2002).

The success of the Gautreaux program led to more than fifty other mobility
programs, including the Moving To Opportunity program (MTO) begun by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1994.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 authorized HUD to
“assist very low-income families with children who reside in public housing or
housing receiving project-based assistance under Section 8 of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1937 to move out of areas with high concentrations
of persons living in poverty (40% or more) to areas with low concentrations
of such persons (less than 10% in poverty)” (Goering & Feins,
2003, p. 6). Moving To Opportunity projects were carried out in five cities:
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Congress stipulated
that HUD conduct evaluations of the program to determine its effects
(Goering & Feins, 2003).

Overall, roughly 5,300 families volunteered to move within the metropolitan
area of the city in which they lived. In total, 4,608 families were eligible.
They were divided into three groups: the MTO “treatment” or experimental
group, which received Section 8 certificates or vouchers that could only be
used in areas where 10 percent or less of the residents lived below official poverty
levels; they also received counseling assistance in finding private rental
units. A second group was given Section 8 certificates with no special restrictions
on where they were to move, and no counseling (Section 8–only group).
An in-place control group continued to receive housing project assistance in
the inner-city neighborhoods where they lived. The families in all three
groups of the MTO program tended to be young single mothers (under age
35), African American, with a median income of $8,200. Most stated that their
main reason for wanting to move was fear of gangs and violence in the neighborhoods
in which they lived.

Social scientists conducted research at all five sites, using HUD data, baseline
surveys, follow-up surveys of families, qualitative interviews, and data on
juvenile crime, labor-market outcomes, and school performance. Among
their findings are the following.

One to three years after the families in the experimental group moved, they
lived in significantly more affluent and more racially mixed communities than
families in the other two groups. In addition, those who were in the experimental
group had median incomes that were 73 percent higher than the median
incomes for the control group and 53 percent higher than the Section
8–only group. In 1997, three years after the program began, the MTO experimental
group families in all five metropolitan areas lived in less-segregated
neighborhoods than either of the other two groups.

Studies of adults in the experimental groups in New York and Boston reported
significantly better health and emotional well-being than the Section
8–only and control groups in those cities. Mothers in both the experimental
groups were much less likely to report being depressed or stressed. The parents
provided more structure for their children’s activities and used less restrictive
parenting styles. By the third year, 10 percent fewer of the experimen-
tal group in New York City were receiving welfare. In Boston, public assistance
for MTO families dropped by half, and employment in all MTO sites increased
from 27 percent at the beginning of the program to 43 percent three
years later. Employment in Boston increased by more than one-half.

The outcomes for children in these experimental groups were also encouraging.
They attended schools that had higher pass rates, more affluent student
bodies, and more resources than the schools attended by control group
children. Ludwig, Duncan, and Ladd (2003) hypothesize that the peer groups
in the new schools had more positive attitudes toward school than in the inner
city, and this may also have contributed to good outcomes for the children.
Ludwig, Duncan, and Ladd report that young children in the experimental
and Section 8–only groups “achieved higher test scores than the controls, and
experienced fewer arrests for violent criminal behavior” (2003, p. 164). The
authors report in some detail the assessments in Baltimore, and state that they
are “largely consistent with evidence from the other MTO sites” (p. 163).
Young children in the experimental and Section 8–only groups had Comprehensive
Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) reading scores that were on average six to
seven percentage points higher than those in the control group (i.e., in low-income
urban schools). “This large effect is equal to around one-quarter of the
control group mean of 25 percentile points and one-quarter of a standard deviation
in the national CTBS math distribution” (p. 165). Children in the experimental
group also raised their CTBS math scores about the same amount,
and their pass rates on the Maryland Functional Tests’ (MFT) reading test
were almost double those in the inner-city schools.

High school students in the Baltimore experimental group had a more difficult
transition. In the first three years of MTO, they had higher rates of grade
retention, disciplinary action, and school dropout rates than the children of
families in the other two groups. The authors suggest that these differences
may be due to the enforcement of higher behavioral and/or educational standards
in more affluent schools (Ludwig et al., 2003).

However, teens who moved from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods were
arrested less often than teens in the other groups. For example, 2.7 percent of
control group adolescents were arrested during an average three-month period,
compared with only 1.4 percent of teens in the experimental group during
the same period. Furthermore, there was a 50 percent reduction in the
proportion of juveniles in the experimental group who were arrested for violent
offenses. For example, in a given quarter, 3 percent of adolescents in the
control group were arrested for violent crimes, compared with only 1.4 percent
among the experimental group (Ludwig et al., 2003).

Research in the Boston MTO found significantly fewer behavioral and mental
health problems among boys in both the experimental and Section 8-only
groups, and experimental-group children were less likely to be injured or to
experience asthma attacks. Among children with asthma, the number of attacks
requiring medical attention fell significantly (Goering & Feins, 2003).

Additionally, the children in the experimental group in Boston were less likely
to engage in antisocial behavior (Ludwig et al., 2003).
In sum, these results are in general agreement with evaluations of other mobility
programs, which have generally led to “substantial improvements in . . .
neighborhood conditions, physical and mental health, safety, housing conditions,
adult labor-market outcomes (although the findings here are mixed)”
(Johnson, Ladd, & Ludwig, 2002, p. 185) and improvements in the children’s
behavior and educational outcomes of families who moved.
The success of even small family supports and of a move to places of increased
opportunity suggests that we should provide a financial and opportunity
base for urban families. This in itself will lay the foundation for fuller
child development and educational achievement.

A New Education Policy Paradigm
I have outlined a number of federal and regional polices and practices that
undermine urban school quality and potential by maintaining large poverty
populations in urban neighborhoods. I have also provided evidence that this
poverty works against the development and achievement of urban students.

Importantly, however, we also see that even modest financial and social supports
for poor families enable the children to achieve at higher levels in
school. This suggests that policies to counter the devastating effects of macroeconomic
and regional mandates and practices should “count” as policies we
call on to create equity and quality in urban districts and schools.

As education policymakers and practitioners, we can acknowledge and act
on the power of urban poverty, low-wage work, and housing segregation to
dwarf most curricular, pedagogical, and other educational reforms. The effects
of macroeconomic policies continually trump the effects of education
policies.

To remove economic barriers to school quality and consequence, we can
legislate a significantly higher living wage; we can create jobs in cities that offer
career ladders and prepare low-income residents to fill them. And, like a
number of European countries, we can tax wealthy families and corporations
to pay for these and other investments. We should enforce federal antidiscrimination
measures to integrate segregated housing and create public transit
routes so low-income urban residents without cars are not denied access to
jobs in the suburbs. Policies like these would create a social foundation on
which high-quality schooling would rest. As has been the case in affluent suburbs,
economic access creates the financial and political conditions in families
and communities for educational commitment and reward.

In this new paradigm, education policies for which we press would take on
the larger issues: Education funding reform would include the companion
need for financing neighborhood jobs and decent wages. New small schools
would be created as an important part of coordinated efforts at neighborhood
revitalization for low-income residents. Vocational offerings in high school
would link to living-wage campaigns and employers who support them. College
graduation would be understood as a continuation of government’s financial
responsibility for public education. And lawsuits to racially integrate
districts would acknowledge housing segregation as fundamental and target
legal challenges accordingly.
Policies that set the standards schools must meet would identify the money,
materials, teachers, courses, and neighborhood needs that must be filled in
order to provide opportunities to learn at high levels. Educational accountability
would be conceived as a public undertaking, centrally involving families,
communities, and students, in consultation with district and government
officials.
In this approach to urban school reform, “policy alignment” would not refer
to the fit between education mandates issued by various levels of government
and bureaucracy. The fit we would seek is between neighborhood, family,
and student needs and the potential of education policies to contribute to
their fulfillment.
However, economic strength and political leverage is not all that is required
to transform urban education. Good schools require not only good neighborhoods,
but—as equity-seeking educational reforms have promised—also the
detracking of minority and working-class youth, a culture responsive to students,
and assistance to teachers in their struggle to surmount the wall of resignation
and defiance that separates many students from the educational enterprise.
A new paradigm of education policy is possible—one that promotes equityseeking
school change and that includes strategies to create conditions that
will allow the educational improvements to take root, grow, and bear fruit in
students’ lives.

Notes
1. The 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) funded and promoted curriculum
materials, primarily in science, math, and foreign languages (e.g., the “New Math”), and
some of these probably found their way into city districts and classrooms. But the NDEA
was aimed at increasing the security and technological prowess of the United States, not
at improving urban schools.

2. Graduation rates in large urban high schools are lower than is commonly believed. Jay
P. Greene, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, calculated graduation
rates in all states and large cities for major racial groups. For this calculation he
first identified the eighth-grade public school enrollment for each jurisdiction and for
each subgroup from the 1993 fall semester, adjusting for student movement into or out
of an area. He then obtained counts of the number of regular high school diplomas
awarded in the spring of 1998 when the eighth graders should have been graduating.
(In calculating the 1998 graduation rate, he did not include later GED or other alternative
diplomas, as the federal government does.) He found that the national graduation
rate for the class of 1998 was 71 percent. For White students the rate was 78 percent, for
African American students it was 56 percent, and for Latinos, 54 percent. In fifteen of
forty-five large (mostly urban) districts for which there were data, fewer than 50 percent
of African American students graduated; and in twenty-one of thirty-six large, mostly urban
districts for which there were data, fewer than 50 percent of Latino students graduated
(Greene, 2001, pp. 1–5).

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Changing Rules and Roles:
A Primer on School-Based Decision Making
BY ANGUS MCBEATH
Department Head for School and District Services
Edmonton Public Schools
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

---------
Angus McBeath has been a teacher and administrator
for the Edmonton Public Schools for more than 25 years.
-----------

-----------------------------
This monograph is based on a
keynote presentation to the
Cross City Campaign for
Urban School Reform School-
Based and Student Achievement
Meeting in Baltimore, Maryland.
Building Success is an
occasional publication of
the Cross City Campaign
for Urban School Reform.
-----------------------------

INTRODUCTION
Edmonton Public Schools, in Alberta, Canada, began
school-based budgeting in 1976 with seven schools.
The transition came about as the result of a management
decision to allow schools to get what they needed
without having to jump through “bureaucratic hoops.”
Today, the Edmonton public school system—which
serves approximately 80,000 students from kindergarten
to twelfth grade in more than 200 schools—is internationally
recognized as an innovative leader in education.

Its public schools offer students and families unprecedented
program choice, resulting in more than 29 distinct
educational alternatives to fit their needs. These
alternative programs include language programming,
a cadet program, sports alternatives, arts core, as well
as programs that employ a particular instructional
approach.

INCREASING THE CHANCE TO
BE SUCCESSFUL
Let me say at the outset that when we
suggest more school districts look at schoolbased
management—or school-site decision
making—as an alternative model for
operation, we are not suggesting that
centralized systems haven’t worked and
won’t work. We are all, in some ways,
products of a centralized system, and so
I have to believe—we have to believe—
that centralized systems can and do work.
However, I strongly believe that schoolsite
decision making gives us more value
from our school systems.

HELPING SCHOOLS
WORK BETTER
School-site decision making, by itself, doesn’t
improve student achievement; but it allows
the school to control enough of the variables
that the principal and staff have a chance to
be successful. Right now, under most central
office configurations, school personnel don’t
feel they control the variables that determine
their success. Most principals don’t control
the staffing, the technology, the standards,
the curriculum, the textbooks, the physical
plant or the ancillary activities that determine
how well schools perform.

If you start with the fundamental belief
that all staff want to be successful—and add
the fact that most of us are more ordinary
than extraordinary—then I think that all
people who work in schools are humbly
asking for is: Can you give me half a chance
to be successful? And, putting it in the most
personal terms, if I believe that I have half a
chance to be successful, I probably can be;
but if I believe that I don’t have even half a
chance, I won’t be. Trust me. I will give up,
surrender, do something else.

Site-based decision making provides
enough control of the crucial ingredients
at the school level that it gives everyone on
the staff the sense that it’s possible to be
successful.

REVERSING ROLES: PRINCIPALS
AND CENTRAL OFFICE STAFF
Before we had school-site decision making
in Edmonton, people in central office were
the “elite” class in our district. After we moved
the money out to schools in 1979, people in
central lost some of their power. Now the
people in central office will tell you, “The
superintendent spends all his time in the
schools. The principals are in charge of almost
everything in the district. They’re in charge of
the schools; we central people aren’t in charge
of anything anymore.” Now, that’s a little bit
of exaggerating. But on a good day, or even a
bad day, that’s generally how many central
people feel. And I’m not as sympathetic as I
should be because I say, “trust me, this
transformation will be good for schools and
central in the longer term.”

That’s because in Edmonton, the principalship
really is the most crucial leadership
position in the district, and the most important
work of the district takes place in the
classroom. In 1995 and ’96, we moved all the
service dollars for consulting, in-services,
maintenance, marketing, technology services,
administrative support and several other
service areas out to the schools. We also gave
principals the flexibility to purchase services
and products from outside the system. That
move—along with having principals report
directly to the superintendent—changed the
attitudes and perceptions of central office staff.
Now they had to serve the schools, and they
had to make sure their skills were finely honed
so that principals would buy their services.
Prior to school-site decision making,
principals often felt that they were not in
control of the critical elements that affected
their schools. I assure you, when principals felt
oppressed, that did not generate good results.
But now our principals know that they have
much more control over how well their
schools perform. It’s quite a role reversal from
the old days, with principals rather than
central services having the resources and
authority to manage their schools.

Has this reversal of roles generated some
challenging consequences for central office
staff? Of course, it has. It’s been interesting
watching the transition, when principals are
allowed to make their own decisions. And that
causes tension for people in central who can
get a little bit wary of the tactics that some
principals can display. When this happens, I
calm my staff down and say, “Look. Will you
give ‘em a break? Many of them are new to
this kind of work. It’s a big deal reporting
directly to the superintendent. And remember
that they’re responsible for all the results.”

EMPOWERING PRINCIPALS
Principals’ jobs are not easy, even in this
empowering district called Edmonton, where
empowerment is something we do, not just
talk about. Principals’ jobs are very tough, and
they have an enormous sense of accountability,
because the buck stops with them. To
begin with, schools get 92 cents out of every
dollar allocated by the district. And parents
hardly ever call central anymore when they’re
unhappy about the way a school is programming
for their child. Why would they call
central? We haven’t any money. There isn’t
anyone down there who can make any
decisions anyway—other than the superintendent.
If all the money is in the schools, and all
the people who are responsible for virtually
everything are in the schools, then you would
call the school principals.

The principals are now in charge of their
buildings. They are in charge of everything
that happens in their buildings and they all
report to the superintendent. But we say the
caveat is we’re going to hold each principal
accountable for their school—how well the
students perform, how well the school
functions. So, if you’re a principal and your
school isn’t achieving good results, you can’t
blame central office! On the other hand,
principals in Edmonton will tell you, “It’s fine
that central sent us 92 percent of the money,
but they also sent us 100 percent of the problems.”
Everything cuts both ways, I guess.
By changing to school-site decision
making, a district is essentially cutting down
on the external factors that influence the way
a school functions.

CREATING A NEW ROLE FOR
CENTRAL OFFICE
Yet the change to a site-based system doesn’t
mean the end of central office, it means a
new role for central office. And there is an
important role for central office in a decentralized
system.

Two things typically happen when you
start talking about school-site decision
making. One, central office staff become
naturally defensive when you suggest that
the number of jobs in central will depend on
the wishes of the schools. The second is that
central office staff also become threatened by
the prospect of a change in the hierarchy.
Now there’s nothing like central office
people. I’m a central office person. I’ve been
at central office for 15 years, and I’ve been
a principal of two schools, and so I’m not
telling stories here to diminish anyone. But
central office has traditionally been the
“ruling class” in most school districts. And
one of the fears that I’ve heard from central
staff in some districts is: “We can’t trust
principals. You just can’t trust ‘em.” I mean
maybe that’s only a phenomenon in the
districts I visit. But central office people
sometimes believe that if principals have
authority, and money, and who knows what
else, they will just misbehave ’cause it’s in
’em! By contrast, what they’re thinking about
themselves is, “But we’re different. We’re
different from them because we’re trustworthy.”
One constant about the ruling class is
that it’s never likely to commit reform on
itself. So, central office rarely reforms itself,
particularly where it involves having to
distribute real power to the schools.

MAKING CENTRAL SERVICES
COMPETITIVE: SELLING
SERVICES TO SCHOOLS
In Edmonton, most of the central staff work
to generate revenue because all of the money
for their services is in the schools. We have
two kinds of central office units: We have
“central-central,” which gets an allocation
from the district budget; then we have “costrecovery
central,” and these offices don’t get
any money from the district budget. Their
money comes from the schools if their
services are bought. Schools can also shop
around and buy these services from outside
the district.

And we don’t have
many rules, by the way,
to determine how these
services are bought. That
has changed the outlook
of the people in central.
After cost recovery was
introduced, our instructional
consulting group
shrank by almost half
during the first several
years. The group has since
increased again due to the
innovative way they
restructured their services.

In fact, the consulting
group is now offering extensive consultation
to high schools, something that had not
occurred for many years, even when consulting
received a central allocation. Other
services have shrunk or expanded too.
All of our technology people, all of our
maintenance staff, all of our consultants, and
all of our marketing people are under cost
recovery—about 75 percent of central staff. We
have only two people in Edmonton who work
in curriculum who are paid for centrally. We
have curriculum-support staff who are paid for
by the schools, and are they ever good! On a
day when the schools don’t want them for
curriculum support, they do other things. If
you want to keep your job in central, and
nobody’s buying what you’re selling, there’s
two things you can do: You can stop doing it
altogether, or you can find services that
schools value. So we retrain our staff.

We also let our staff sell services everywhere
else in the world. We believe that it
keeps them employed, and it helps underwrite
the costs of producing services and materials
for our own teachers. We sold over $1 million
of curricular resource materials last year alone!

And our staff are hired as consultants by other
districts in Ontario, Saskatchewan and
different parts of Alberta. When our own
superintendent wants to use the services of
cost-recovery central, he has to buy their
services too. It’s incredibly validating. A staff
person said to me the other day, “You know I
wish I were in cost recovery instead of centralcentral.
Do you know why? When you’re
cost recovery and people are buying your
services, it is so validating to know that what
you do is valuable to the schools.”

Some people at central will say, “Principals
won’t know if they need certain central
office services.” So I then have to ask, “Are
the schools achieving the results? Are the IPP
(individualized program plan) results being
met? Is each child’s writing and reading
moving up a grade a year? Are the schools
meeting their targets on the provincial
achievement test? Are the parents satisfied?
Are the staff satisfied? Are the school buildings
in good shape? If they’re doing all of
that and they’re not using curriculum
specialists or social workers, then we’ve got
to back off.”

In the end, cost recovery actually adds
value to the system. Principals can make
choices. They can manage their schools
according to identified needs and priorities.
They determine what they see as valuable
and what they consider not worthwhile. As
a result, school staff respond to the services
provided differently. Schools don’t behave
the same when the costs for services come
out of their own budgets. They tend to be a
bit more cautious about consumption than
when the district paid the bills.

LEARNING THE HARD WAY
When we handed out the money to the
schools in 1979, we had virtually no
measures and no articulated standards to
determine whether the schools were doing
their work well enough. The first criticism
was that the superintendent at the time had
created 200 school districts in Edmonton,
each seemingly accountable to itself, and
there was going to be complete chaos.
I can tell you there was nothing close to
chaos. But the district did have to do a better
job of defining what authority and responsibilities
schools had, and what authority and
responsibilities central office had. So, we
learned the hard way.

Let me give you one example. In ’79,
some of our teachers didn’t believe they had
to teach the mandated curriculum. Granted
the curriculum wasn’t always written precisely,
but we didn’t know if they were teaching it. So,
we thought, “Well we’ll try persuading them to
teach the curriculum.” That didn’t work. Then
we thought, “We’ll lecture them to do the right
thing.” That didn’t work. Then we said to the
principals, “It is your job to know that every
teacher in every classroom in every school is
teaching the mandated curriculum.” We have
since developed a number of district-level
measures to determine whether there is
curriculum alignment happening in our
schools. And I raise this point because one of
the tensions that occurs when you move money
out is that you change the whole accountability
structure.

In the old days, before we had ways to
measure the results schools are expected to
achieve, we just had people monitoring the
processes schools used. There were principals
who believed they were successful because the
people in charge liked the processes they used.
And sometimes you got in trouble because you
used a process that somebody in central didn’t
favor. Now, under site-based decision making in
our district, we say, “Here are the results you are
responsible for achieving; and if the processes
are not immoral, illegal, unethical; if they won’t
“dis-elect” the board of trustees or disenchant
the staff, students and parents, then go ahead.”
Today if you’re achieving the results and
you’re using a pedagogy that isn’t the “flavor of
the month,” or if the superintendent doesn’t
like it, the principal can say, “Excuse me. Are
these results good enough? Did they meet or
exceed the provincial standards? Have they met
the targets we set when we did our planning
and budgeting?” “Yes?” “Then it’s really none
of your business.” And I think that is very
freeing to principals—not to have to guess
at the system’s true agenda—“What is the
methodology that I have to use, or pretend
I use in this school, in order to please my
master?” The results can speak for the school
and the principal. When you focus on and
measure results objectively, it’s cleaner:
Everything’s on the table, it’s up front, it’s
known in advance.

But that’s not to say that process doesn’t
matter. Process does matter. The truth is, you
obtain good results from high-quality processes.
Site-based decision making helps take some of
the subjectivity—the personality issues and
biases, if you will—out of the process. It allows
each school to select the processes that get
results in their own context.

HOLDING PRINCIPALS
ACCOUNTABLE
So, how do we hold our principals in
Edmonton accountable? If you’re going to
send the schools 92 cents on the dollar, tell
the principals they’re really accountable and
have the authority, then you must have a very
sophisticated and highly regarded monitoring
system in order to know what’s happening at
each school.

Our superintendent has all 203 principals
report directly to him. And there is a small
infrastructure behind the superintendent to
give him data on the performance of each
school. The dossier of information that the
superintendent has on each school is information
the principal knows is being collected.
Principals are active participants in deciding
what information will be provided, and in
compiling it. So principals know what results
the superintendent monitors. They know what
measures will be used to assess school performance.
When the criteria are publicly identified,
that eliminates 99 percent of the politics.

For example, the superintendent has
information on how satisfied the parents,
staff and students of each school are
longitudinally on a whole range of issues.
The superintendent knows about the
technology in that school. The superintendent
knows how well the children write.

We have graded writing tests that tell you
exactly what grade level each child is
writing at in the school. We know how
many children are writing at grade three
who are in grade three; how many children
are writing at grade four who are in grade
three; how many children are writing at
grade two level in grade three; and so on.
And we have reading and math levels on
every student.

School profiles are prepared for the
superintendent centrally. I have been told,
and the superintendent’s been told, that
he knows more about our schools than is
generally known by any one person in
any highly centralized school district.

In addition to the information the
superintendent has in a dossier, the
superintendent goes out to each school for
a school visit. And by visit, I don’t mean
a tour, I don’t mean a political photo
opportunity. Before he goes out to the
school, the superintendent e-mails the
principal, “Here are all the questions I’m
going to ask you about student achievement,
about your special needs population, about
satisfaction of the students. I’m going to ask
you about your facility and what needs to be
done and what has been done. I’m going to
ask you about staff performance and
satisfaction.”

In short, that portfolio of information is
very important because some people fear
that if you do not have an army of central
office people watching over the schools,
then you will not have good results in the
schools. I think that’s absolutely not true,
provided that the principal knows there is a
fair and equitable monitoring system, and
you put the real results on the table.

As I say this, don’t think that we let
principals struggle alone with this. Absolutely
not! We provide a whole principal
certification program of our own that’s
accepted as university credit-level courses for
those who want to be principals. We have
training programs for first-year principals,
and principal institutes for established
principals. We have a cost-recovery department
that provides advice and assistance
to principals facing difficulties because of
emergencies, for working with difficult
people or in resolving conflict, for handling
mediation, and for handling expulsions and
suspensions. We’re not going to make our
principals do it all alone.

MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
ARE TWO-WAY STREETS
Under a traditional central office system,
monitoring and assessment of how things are
working are one-way streets—top down. In
our school-site system, not only do principals
have tremendous autonomy in decision
making, we have a built-in system where each
year they can rate their satisfaction with
central service units. The rating system has
been in effect in one form or another for
several years, and last year principal satisfaction
with the services provided by central
ranged from 84 percent for the lowest-rated
service to 99 percent for our highest-rated
area of service. Not bad, eh! And, each
principal gets to rate his/her satisfaction
with the performance of the superintendent
of schools.

We also conduct an annual survey of
teachers, parents and students that indicates
there’s a high level of satisfaction with central
office among all these groups. In order to
function under site-based decision making,
you have to have an unrelenting commitment
to “right-size” an organization, and
then review your effort each year. You also
have to be sure to get feedback from all parts
of the system.

ELIMINATING DUMB RULES
One of the inevitable things that happens
when you give principals the money and the
authority is that you have to deregulate an
awful lot of regulations that people loved.

One of the saddest things that happened,
and it happens from time to time, is that
when you give principals all this authority,
trust, and money—somebody is going to do
something that will end up in the headlines
of the paper. I know in the past every time a
principal did something like this, we added
more supervision for all principals, and then
wrote a regulation to ensure that no one
would ever make that mistake again. In other
words, we wrote a stupid rule. And instead of
one principal being dealt with, we prevented
all principals from doing something. And
before long, you have a whole bunch of rules.

Under our current superintendent of
schools, I headed up a “Dumb Rules Committee”
for the district. We asked all staff in the
district, “Please submit your idea of a dumb
rule.” The rules we hoped they’d submit were
ones that prevented our schools from being
effective. Over 300 “dumb rules” were
submitted, and most of them weren’t even
rules! They were practices built into the
behavior of the organization. They had the
force of rules, but, in fact, were not policies at
all. It is the way “things have always been
done.” This happened just over five years ago
and I can barely recall the rules and the
practices we eliminated.

Now, what happens when a principal does
something that ends up in the headlines or
that just shouldn’t have been done? I’ll give
you a real example. Schools are allowed to
have two school-wide professional days per
year. They can also have other professional
development days beyond that. The school
has the authority to decide what kinds of
activities the whole staff should engage in,
and they don’t have to report it to anybody.
They notify their parents that the school is
closed on a certain day for professional
development. But, one year, a principal
decided to take his school staff off to spend
the whole day learning about high-quality
investments and mutual funds. Now, this
became highly publicized—and you know
what that does to a board of trustees!

The first habitual response was, “Let’s
remove the principals’ authority to set
professional development days. Let’s regulate
what principals do. Let’s make them write
500-word submissions, have 20 people review
them, ’cause that way we’ll never get
embarrassed again.” That’s how we used to
respond. Now, we say, “When one person
does something dumb, we’re going to deal
with that one person. And we’re going to
work to keep ourselves from creating a
regulation . . . because you will surely kill
them if you tell them they have authority
when they don’t have genuine authority.” But
it takes great political fortitude on the part of
superintendents and boards to stay the course
and not respond by creating more rules. What
we tend to forget is that whatever is today’s
awful headline, next week something even
worse will have happened in some other
sector of society. And believe it or not, it may
be painful today, but in a few days it’ll pass.
So when things go wrong in our district,
we take action at that location with the
person who made the decision. New
district rules are then avoided.
When principals see that there are
endless rules governing their every move,
can you blame them for behaving as if
they’re not responsible for deciding much of
anything. I defy you to show me an effective
system where a bunch of supervisors
downtown can know each school so well
that they can, by remote control, decide
what is best for each school in the district.

DEALING WITH NONPERFORMING
SCHOOLS
Even in a decentralized system, central is
not without authority. The superintendent
knows exactly which schools are performing,
and he has the option of centralizing a
school or a portion of a school’s operation
that is performing weakly. This can be done
cooperatively, or not; it can be done
temporarily, or permanently. The superintendent
can also deploy people from central
office to help shore up a school’s operation.

IN THE END
Let’s face it. Most school systems will not
have school-site decision making. School-site
decision making is a long-term reform, and
most superintendents’ tenures aren’t long
enough to see it through. In my view, it
takes a strong central office and strong
schools, partnered with their communities,
to ensure that our schools meet standards.

From the high ratings our central people
receive from the principals to the crucial
role principals play as senior staff, I think
we’ve come a long way from the days when
central and schools were pitted against each
other, with no one the winner. When you
combine school-site decision making with
the superintendent’s and board’s unrelenting
focus on student achievement, I think
you have the basis of an excellent school
system. Edmonton parents seem to agree,
as we have virtually eliminated the market
share that private and charter schools had
in our city.

All of us from different districts are in
various stages of moving money and
authority out to schools. As you do that,
you change the whole paradigm about how
a district operates. I’m not here to tell you
that Edmonton has invented the Holy Grail.
We do not have the magic elixir of life. We
have not fixed all the problems of the
public schools, but we keep working on it,
convinced that we’re on the right track.
----------------------

ABOUT THE CROSS CITY CAMPAIGN
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is a national network of parents, advocates, community organizers, teachers, principals, central office administra312.322.4880 ■ Fax: 312.322.4885 ■ www.crosscity.org

The Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reformtors, policy analysts, union officials, researchers and funders dedicated to improving public schools and education for urban young people. We currently operate in nine cities—Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia and Seattle. Our mission is to fundamentally transform urban public education, resulting in improved quality and equity, so that all youth are well prepared for post-secondary education, work and citizenship.